|Author:||David M. Rocke,George W. Downs|
|Title:||Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control|
|Format:||lrf rtf mobi doc|
|ePUB size:||1488 kb|
|FB2 size:||1633 kb|
|DJVU size:||1565 kb|
|Category:||Politics and Government|
|Publisher:||University of Michigan Press; First edition edition (January 1, 1990)|
Examines techniques and strategies of tacit bargaining in attempts to slow or halt arms races and maintain arms agreements has been added to your Cart.
Start by marking Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. George W. Downs is an eminent American political scientist. He has been a professor of politics at New York University since 1998, where he served as Dean of Social Science from 2001 to 2009. Previously he served as Boswell Professor of Peace and War at Princeton University from 1987 to 1998.
George W. Downs and David M. Rocke. Examines techniques and strategies of tacit bargaining in attempts to slow or halt arms races and maintain arms agreements. When most people, including social scientists, reflect on the ways that nations resolve their differences, they tend to think in terms of polar alternatives: war versus negotiation. This perspective ignores a third path: tacit bargaining, which is applicable, as this book shows, to a wide variety of international issues and is especially germane to the problem of treaty maintenance.
Introduction Thomas Mahnken 9. Arms Races and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Avi Kober 10. Arms and Assistance in South Asia 1953–1965: Why Racing Alone Explains Little Rudra Chaudhuri 11. Racing from Behind: China and the Dynamics of Arms Chases and Races in East Asia in the Twenty-First Century Tai Ming Cheung 12. Armaments Developments Since the Cold War Thomas Mahnken Conclusion David Stevenson. 12 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966); George W. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races and Arms Control (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1990). 13 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results’, Public Policy 8 (1958), 41–86. 14 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (London, 1961), ix–x, 5–6. OUP Corrected proof – final, 16/10/15, spi. 4.
Home All Categories Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control. ISBN13: 9780472064502. Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control. by David M. Rocke and George W. Downs.
George Woodrow Downs, Jr. (August 6, 1946 – January 21, 2015) was an American political scientist and pioneer of the application of noncooperative game theory to international politics. He was a professor of politics at New York University, where he served as chair of the political science department (1998–2001), Dean of Social Science (2001–2009), and later as the Bernhardt Denmark Professor of International Affairs. Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (1990; coauthored with David Rocke). Collective security beyond the Cold War (1994).
ASJC Scopus subject areas. Political Science and International Relations. Sociology and Political Science.
David M. Rocke (b. 1946) is an American statistician and Distinguished Professor at the University of California, Davis. In addition to a large number of scholarly articles, he has coauthored two books with George W. Downs on the application of statistical methods to international relations: Optimal Imperfection? and Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control. Among his numerous academic honors, Rocke is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal Statistical Society, and an elected Member of the International Statistical Institute.
Download Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races and Arms Control by George W. Between Fragmentation and Democracy. ISBN 10: 110841687X ISBN 13: 9781108416870. Download Between Fragmentation and Democracy by Eyal Benvenisti. ISBN 10: 1108403395 ISBN 13: 9781108403399. Download Collective Security beyond the Cold War by George W. How Private George W. Peck Put Down the Rebellion How Private George W. Peck Put Down the Rebellion. ISBN 10: 1163981354 ISBN 13: 9781163981351.
7 Downs, George W. et a. Arms Races and Cooperation, World Politics 38 (October 1985), 118–46, at 139–42, reprinted in Oye, Kenneth . e. Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 8 Formally, the only requirement for an arms race is that each side prefer mutual escalation to unilateral reduction. This leaves open the possibility that a given arms race could be motivated by a wide variety of games. Of course, each participant in an arms race may have a different set of preferences and may thus be playing a different game