Much of what he says about personal identity relies on it. He labours to defend it against the 18th-century charge of circularity (essay 5) and more recent attacks by Bernard Williams (essay 6). Essay 8 considers the relation between mentalism and the Parfitian view that our identity over time has no practical importance. Perry’s view of personal identity is most distinctive in its treatment of the fission puzzle. Suppose we accept mentalism: that what makes a past or future person me rather than someone else is his standing at that time in some psychological relation to me as I am now.
Start by marking Identity, Personal Identity and the Self as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. John R. Perry (born 1943) is Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. Perry (born 1943) is Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside
John Perry is Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University, co-host of the award-winning radio program "Philosophy Talk," and author of many books including Knowledge, Possibility, and Conciousness and Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self. Bernard Williams' "The Self and the Future" and Derek Parfit's "Personal Identity" are probably the two most influential papers on personal identity in the last hundred years. 5 people found this helpful.
The cohabitation theory is a popular solution to the problem of personal fission. It affirms that all the people who result from fission were there cohabiting the pre-fission body all along. Adopting this solution is an uncontroversial move for, but is it open to s too? Some have thought so, but Katherine Hawley, Mark Johnston, and Eric Olson have argued to the contrary. They claim s simply cannot be cohabitation theorists. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
This volume collects a number of Perry's classic works on personal identity as well as four new pieces, The Two Faces of Identity,Persons and Information,Self-Notions and The Self, and The Sense of Identity. Format Paperback 280 pages.
This volume collects a number of Perry's classic works on personal identity as well as four new pieces, The Two Faces of Identity, Persons and Information, Self-Notions and The Self, and The Sense of Identity.
Personal Name: Perry, John, 1943-. On this site it is impossible to download the book, read the book online or get the contents of a book. The administration of the site is not responsible for the content of the site. The data of catalog based on open source database. All rights are reserved by their owners.
John Perry (e. University of California Press (1975). University of California, Riverside. Contents PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 John Perry: The Problem of Personal Identity, 3 PART II: VERSIONS OF THE MEMORY THEORY 2 John Locke: Of Identity and. Brain Circularity Consciousness Identity Individuation Memory Mental States Metaphysics Mode Personal Identity Scepticism Soul Substance Unity Butler Hume Locke.
by Perry, John, 1943-. Publication date 1975.