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ISBN:8170493196
Author: Mark D. Mandeles
ISBN13: 978-8170493198
Title: The Future of War: Organizations as Weapons
Format: lit azw docx mbr
ePUB size: 1150 kb
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Language: English
Publisher: Manas Publications (July 30, 2007)
Pages: 224

The Future of War: Organizations as Weapons by Mark D. Mandeles



Personal Name: Mandeles, Mark David, 1950-. Potomac Books, (c)2005. Mark Mandeles argues that the key to future combat effectiveness is not in acquiring new technologies but rather in the Defense Department's institutional and organizational structure and its effect upon incentives to invent, to innovate, and to conduct operations effectively. Doing so requires that the military establishment resist incentives to substitute short-term technological gains for long-term operational advantages and to maintain incentives for effective long-term innovation.

Many analysts have heralded the . Mark D. Mandeles argues that the key to future combat effectiveness is not in acquiring new technologies but rather in the Defense Department’s institutional and organizational structure and its effect upon incentives to invent, to innovate, and to conduct operations effectively. Doing so requires the military establishment to resist incentives to substitute short-term technological gains for long-term operational advantages and to maintain incentives for effective long-term innovation.

Naval historian and defense analyst Mark Mandeles has produced a work that looks at how organizations affect warmaking. He cogently demonstrates that much of contemporary talk about Revolutions in Military Affairs or Fourth Generation Warfare or Information Age Warfare is actually about technology and what it might be able to do, rather than about how to organize and apply these technologies toward the attainment of strategic objectives. Mandeles’ analysis is rooted in history. And he handles it right. From there, he examines the 1990-1991 Gulf War air campaign for organizational ideas and decisions that may provide clues to the future evolution of warmaking. He then discusses net-centric warfare as a proposed operational concept, before proceeding to examine a number of possible alternative command and control models that might be adopted to implement this concept.

Uploaded by. Mark D Mandeles. Chapter 1. Introduction We can. never know or understand all the implications of any theory, or its full significance. i Introduction Over the last few years, many military observers and analysts have pronounced that the . Organizations have always been central to the planning of combat and its conduct. Outline of the Book Establishing the importance of organizations to combat capability is not the principal purpose of this study, although the role of organizations will be addressed in the context of the RMA.

Many analysts have heralded the . military s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a qualitative improvement in operational concepts and weapons that transforms the nature and character of warfare. Focusing on military technology, most argue that the new sensor, surveillance, communications, and computational technologies will usher in a period in which . military capabilities will far exceed those of potential competitors.

Author : Mark D. Mandeles. Publisher : Manas Publications. Mandeles argues that the key to future combat effectiveness is not in acquiring new technologies but rather in the Defense Department s institutional and organizational structure and its effect upon incentives to invent, to innovate, and to conduct operations effectively. military's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a qualitative improvement in operational concepts and weapons that transforms the nature and character of warfare.

Mark D.

ru - Many analysts have heralded the .

Many analysts have heralded the U.S. military s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a qualitative improvement in operational concepts and weapons that transforms the nature and character of warfare. Focusing on military technology, most argue that the new sensor, surveillance, communications, and computational technologies will usher in a period in which U.S. military capabilities will far exceed those of potential competitors. Developments in such fields as nanotechnology, robotics, and genetic engineering will greatly influence new weapons designs of the twenty-first century. These discussions about military revolutions, however, too often ignore or only pay lip service to the role of military organization in improving combat capability. They downplay the relationship between organizational structure and outcomes, the difficulties of coordinating large organizations composed of many people and offices having specialized roles, and the challenges of calculation, attention, and memory that face individuals making decisions with inadequate or ambiguous information under short deadlines or stressful situations. Mark D. Mandeles argues that the key to future combat effectiveness is not in acquiring new technologies but rather in the Defense Department s institutional and organizational structure and its effect upon incentives to invent, to innovate, and to conduct operations effectively. Doing so requires the military establishment to resist incentives to substitute short-term technological gains for long-term operational advantages and to maintain incentives for effective long-term innovation.
Reviews: 5
Perius
The sub title of this book, "Organizations as Weapons" is derived from a comment made by a U.S. Congressman in 1986.This is certainly an interesting concept, but it really does not describe the contents of this book. In point of fact, the book is a very good and careful dissection of the concept of network centric warfare. The author clearly supports the concept and sees it as the convergence of the Information Revolution and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). He provides the reader with a careful and well thought out discussion of the implications of this concept not only on military organization, but on personnel, and operations. He notes the problems raised by the concept and cites specific examples of how it works. In the course of doing this, he also provides a very nice tribute to Jean de Bloch a brilliant and prescient late 19th Century military thinker and strategist who inexplicably has been largely forgotten. Bloch developed the method of multi-level analysis of warfare which has three layers: 1) analysis of technology; 2) analysis of tactics and operations; and 3) analysis of the actions and behaviors of people and organizations making up nation states. The author applies Bloch's analytic method in his analysis of network centric warfare. At least to this reviewer this book offers the clearest and most well developed explanation of network centric warfare available.

My only quarrel with this excellent and thought provoking book is that it introduces yet another appalling military acronym, C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) which is apparently is how the U.S. military describes network centric warfare. Well, as long as they understand what C4ISR stands for I guess it is al right.
Erennge
The author makes three assumptions--that military revolutions do occur; that it is possible to identify them while they are occurring; and that their ultimate effects can be predicted and shaped by current actions. Drawing upon economics, political science, sociology, and history and influenced by his own experiences as an analyst on the U.S. Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey, Mark D. Mandeles argues that those seeking to transform the modern American military have focused too heavily on changes in technology and techniques and not enough on the organizational implications of the digital revolution. In his view the goal should be to organize all American forces into three unified commands by mid-21st Century: a precision-strike command; a constabulary command; and a conventional command.

The Future of War is a brilliant analysis of trends in the post-Cold War military. It deserves reading as much for the author's way of reaching his conclusions as the conclusions themselves. Historians will find his reflections on the role of chance and contingency in the preparations for the Gulf War well worth the price of the book. Students of the contemporary military scene and force planners will find the volume very thought provoking. Because of the range of disciplines the author draws upon, this is not an easy read--but it is an important one and well worth the time invested. Highly recommended.

Edgar F. Raines, Jr.
Lucam
Mark Mandeles introduces a true revolutionary concept in "The Future of War" -- the foundation of a core of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) officers.

In the introduction, Mandeles offers 7 questions that he will analyze throughout the book. He also postulates there are 3 different organizational structure -- loosely coupled, tightly coupled, and a news media organization. During his conclusion chapter, however he focuses only on answering the 7 questions in terms of the loosely coupled organization, and he neglects a meaningful analyis of the questions in the other two.

My other complaint is that he offers that the advance of technology put NASA engineers who questioned the safety of the shuttle launch in direct contact with the NASA director. With this direct interface, the engineers were cowed into silence when asked for concerns about launch safety. Rather than this being an example of an informal organization, command and control theorists will recognize this as merely a form of the "directed telescope" first used effectively by Napoleon. Technology is merely an enabler -- the command structure has always remained the same.

Mandeles does offer the fascinating concept of an RMA officer. In essence, the military would groom a class of officers to lead the next RMA, whatever it may be. The challenge with this concept is being able to identify the next great idea. There is an old adage in the military that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. With declining military budgets, it will be increasingly hard to implement these new ideas.

The book is supported with great examples of how the formal, informal, and media organizations have worked in "combat" situations. Overall, Mandeles does offer good ideas, but I found his concluding analysis to be incomplete.
Zan
Military organizations change slowly. The last big change in the United States military from an organizational sense was the closer integration of the various services under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. World War II was fought with almos as much fighting between the Army and the Navy that it is somewhat surprising that we had time for the Germans and the Japanese.

It took considerable effort on the part of the military to meet Goldwater-Nichols. But by the first Iraq war considerable progress had been made. By the second there even more.

This book looks at even further organizational changes to reflect the changes in information warfare, the role of the media, and the changing battlefield as superpower confrontation recedes further into the past and the nature of battles to be expected in the future changes.